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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked tort 
common law to interpret federal discrimination statutes.1 During this same 
time period, the Supreme Court increasingly invoked textualism as the 
appropriate methodology for interpreting these statutes.2 One immediate effect 
of these two trendstortification and textualismis to restrict discrimination 
law by tightening causal standards.3  
This Article explores how interpreting discrimination statutes through the 
lenses of tort law and textualism can expand, rather than restrict, 
discrimination law. It assumes that courts will continue to characterize 
discrimination statutes as torts and as deriving from the common law, despite 
strong arguments to the contrary.4 It then shows how using tort law and 
textualism should clarify the roles of intent and causation in discrimination 
analysis, alter the way courts conceive intent, lower the harm threshold for 
some cases, and alter current conceptions of textualism.  
While these changes would radically change current discrimination law, 
they do not require the courts to engage in radical statutory interpretation. 
They only require the courts to take the combined influences of textualism and 
tortification seriously. This Article shows how each of these changes can occur 
if courts simply continue with the interpretive framework set forth in recent 
Supreme Court cases. This framework assumes that when Congress used a 
word in the discrimination statutes, it intended those words to have a common 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I would like to thank the 
Symposium participants and my colleagues at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, 
who provided comments and critiques of earlier versions of this Article. 
 1 See infra Part II. 
 2 See infra Part II. 
 3 See infra Part II. 
 4 I explore why the discrimination statutes are unlike tort law in other works. Sandra 
F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014) [hereinafter Sperino, Tort Label]; 
Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law and Proximate Cause, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2. 
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law tort meaning, unless otherwise indicated.5 Thus, a court need only look at 
words in the discrimination statutes and then look to common law meanings to 
define those words. Likewise, the absence of tort words would mean that 
Congress did not intend to invoke a particular tort concept. 
Applying this interpretive frame results in several important doctrinal 
shifts in discrimination law. If tort law is the baseline for understanding 
discrimination law, then discrimination statutes are not intentional torts. None 
of the major federal discrimination statutes use the word “intent” or “intend” 
in its primary operative language. And, recent Supreme Court cases have 
confirmed that the “because of” language in the discrimination statutes refers 
to causation.6 Causation is a different concept than intent. While scholars have 
long argued that plaintiffs should not be required to prove intent to establish 
disparate treatment claims, the interpretive frame of tortification plus 
textualism lends further support for this argument. 
 The move to tort law also helps plaintiffs who want to proceed under a 
more traditional, intent-based framework. Although the primary provisions of 
the discrimination statutes do not use intent language, courts often use an 
intent-based analysis in individual disparate treatment cases. If the courts 
interpret the discrimination statutes to contain an implied intent standard, they 
should look to the common law to define intent. If they do, the discrimination 
intent standard should be a much less onerous standard than the one courts 
currently use in the discrimination context. Further, using common law ideas 
of intent opens the possibility that plaintiffs could use the doctrine of 
transferred intent to establish liability. 
If discrimination is a tort, then substantive harassment law is miscalibrated 
in the context of physical contact or threatened physical contact. Under current 
doctrine, a supervisor can touch or threaten to touch a worker in inappropriate 
ways and the worker may lose her harassment case because the conduct was 
not severe or pervasive enough to constitute harassment.7 Using tort law, the 
plaintiff should be able to recover once she has established that she was 
subjected to unwelcome touching or imminent, threatened touching because of 
her protected trait. This move would align discrimination law with tort law, 
which recognizes one inappropriate touching or threatened touching is enough 
to result in liability.8 Importantly, tortification and textualism should lead 
courts to recalibrate and lower the harm threshold in discrimination cases. 
Tortification also poses a threat to modern statutory interpretation. When 
the Supreme Court declares discrimination to be a tort that derives from the 
common law, the Court is also undermining the idea that the meaning of 
statutory words is fixed at the time of a statute’s enactment.   The common law 
                                                                                                                     
 5 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
 6 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525–26 (2013); Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 7 Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing the severe and pervasive standard). 
 8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 21 (1965). 
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of torts is both a set of substantive choices and a methodology.  This 
methodology allows tort law to change both subtly and dramatically over time, 
and is a key feature of what it means for something to be a tort and to derive 
from the common law. Tortifying discrimination law means that the 
discrimination statutes should at least respond to underlying changes in tort 
law. It also opens the possibility that discrimination law retains the flexibility 
to respond to changing circumstances, such as new understandings about the 
way discrimination is perpetuated. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the move to infuse 
discrimination statutes with a tort backdrop and meaning, as well as the move 
to textualism. Part III demonstrates how the combined influences of 
tortification and textualism mean that discrimination claims do not require a 
plaintiff to establish intent. Part IV argues that to the extent plaintiffs want to 
rely on intent-based frameworks, tort law intent is less onerous than the intent 
standard used in discrimination cases. Part V discusses how harassment 
doctrine should be recalibrated to reflect tort law and shows how tortification 
and textualism can be used to argue against current harm thresholds. Part VI 
explores how the tortification of discrimination law presents a major challenge 
to modern conceptions of statutory interpretation. 
II. THE MOVE TO TORT LAW AND TEXTUALISM 
This section discusses how Supreme Court cases over the past few decades 
embraced tort law as a substantive framework for discrimination law and 
textualism as an interpretive methodology. 
Since 2009, the Supreme Court has rapidly infused discrimination law 
with tort concepts. This section provides a brief overview of the recent 
tortification trend. It explores this trend through case law interpreting two 
major federal discrimination statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).9 
Title VII, which is considered to be the cornerstone federal discrimination 
statute, provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
     (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
                                                                                                                     
 9 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). The arguments 
made in this Article are applicable to the ADA context as well. Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).  The ADA is not a primary focus of this discussion 
because the Supreme Court cases center on Title VII and the ADEA. I will not make 
arguments about cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
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     (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.10 
Although not identical, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act has 
similarly broad operative language.11 Both Title VII and the ADEA contain 
inexact operative language that, in some instances, only vaguely describes the 
conduct prohibited under the statutes. Congress did not originally describe 
what kind of causation is required to establish a violation of these statutes. It 
did not use the word “intent” in the main provisions and did not define 
whether discrimination had to be intentional to violate the statutes. 
In the 1970s and for most of the 1980s, the Supreme Court rarely invoked 
tort law to interpret these statutes. Over the last three decades, the Supreme 
Court has explicitly applied tort law to discrimination cases, especially cases 
involving intent and causation. The use of tort law in discrimination cases has 
become more robust and automatic in the past decade. 
A watershed moment for the tortification of discrimination law occurred in 
1989. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court considered whether 
a plaintiff could prevail on a Title VII claim if the evidence established that 
legitimate and discriminatory reasons both played a role in the employer’s 
refusal to promote her.12 In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor 
proclaimed that Title VII is a “statutory employment tort.”13  
 In Price Waterhouse, the plurality opinion ultimately rejected tort 
principles. A plurality of four justices described the statutory problem before 
it, not through the lens of tort law, but rather as a broader question about the 
nature of causation.14 The issue was not what tort law required, but about what 
kind of conduct violates Title VII. The plurality recognized that this question 
required the Court to consider how Title VII balanced the interests of 
employees and employers.15 It rejected the idea that causation meant that the 
plaintiff is required to establish “but-for” cause.16 The plurality reasoned that 
“to construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for 
causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”17 The plurality held that to prevail 
on a discrimination claim, the plaintiff must establish that a protected trait is a 
motivating factor in a decision.18  
                                                                                                                     
 10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).  
 11 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).  
 12 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 13 Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14 Id. at 237 (plurality opinion). 
 15 Id. at 239. 
 16 Id. at 240. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244. 
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In 1991, Congress responded to Price Waterhouse and other decisions by 
amending Title VII.19 Importantly, the amendments do not mimic tort common 
law. For example, one change made by the 1991 amendments was to clarify 
through statutory language that a plaintiff can prevail on a Title VII claim if 
she shows a protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment decision. 
Under the amendment, a plaintiff may prevail on a Title VII discrimination 
claim if she establishes a protected trait was a motivating factor for a decision, 
and the employer may establish a limited defense to damages only if it shows 
it would have made the same decision absent a protected trait.20 The 
substantive standards used in the amendment and the limited defense to 
damages are not directly drawn from the common law. 
Nonetheless, the move to tort law gained momentum in 2009. In Gross v. 
FBL Financial Services, the Court held that the ADEA required a showing of 
but-for causation.21 The Court rejected the idea that the ADEA should use the 
same causal standard as Title VII.22 After rejecting the Title VII causal 
standard, the Justices were faced with a choice: what should the ADEA’s 
causal standard be? For the majority opinion, the answer was short and simple. 
The words “because of” mean “but-for” cause.23 In support of this proposition, 
Justice Thomas cited two cases outside the employment discrimination context 
and a torts treatise.24  
The Gross decision is notably different than O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Price Waterhouse. It is strongly textual and purports to rely on the plain 
meaning of the words “because of.”25 The opinion stated that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving but-for cause because this is the typical way 
burdens are allocated in litigation.26 If Congress wanted to upset this typical 
allocation, it was required to explicitly do so.27  
The Supreme Court also invoked common law tort principles in Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital, in which the Court interpreted the Uniformed Services 
                                                                                                                     
 19 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).  
 20 Id. Congress also amended Title VII’s disparate impact provisions and these 
amendments do not mimic tort law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
 21 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 22 Id. at 174. 
 23 Id. at 176. 
 24 Id. at 176–77 (citing Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653–54 
(2008); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64, & n.14 (2007); W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 25 Id. at 176. 
 26 Id. at 177.  
 27 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). This statement is strange 
given that Price Waterhouse allocated burdens differently without an express statutory 
provision and that tort law also allows for burdens to be allocated differently in some 
scenarios. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 (1989) (plurality opinion). The 
Gross majority noted that Price Waterhouse would be decided differently if it arose in 
2009. Gross, 557 U.S. at 178–79. 
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Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).28 Staub used two 
common law ideas: intent and proximate cause.29 The Court’s short analysis 
began with the statement: “[W]e start from the premise that when Congress 
creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law.”30 Although 
Staub considered an interpretive question under USERRA, lower courts have 
applied this reasoning in the Title VII context because the Supreme Court 
emphasized the similarities between USERRA and Title VII in the Staub 
decision.31 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court 
determined whether a plaintiff proceeding on a retaliation claim under Title 
VII is required to establish but-for cause.32 As with Gross, the opinion 
partially relied on the complex relationship between past Supreme Court 
precedents and the 1991 amendments to Title VII. However, this does not 
detract from the importance of the role of tort law in this case. Once the Court 
decided not to follow Price Waterhouse and the 1991 amendments to Title 
VII, it was required to make a choice regarding what the causation standard 
should be. The choice the Court makes—but-for cause—is largely driven by 
the majority opinion’s narrow view of tort law and by Gross, which also relied 
on tort law.33 
Nassar invoked tort law from the beginning of the opinion, defining the 
case as one involving causation and then noting that causation inquiries most 
commonly arise in tort cases.34 The majority engaged in a lengthy discussion 
of causation’s role in tort law, with numerous citations to the Restatement of 
Torts and a torts treatise.35  
This increased use of tort law in discrimination coincided with the rise of 
the “new textualist philosophy.”36 Although definitions of textualism vary, this 
methodology defines the meaning of the statute by looking primarily at the 
language of the statute, without considering certain types of legislative 
history.37 This methodology heavily relies on the text of the statute and certain 
                                                                                                                     
 28 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190–94 (2011). 
 29 Id. at 1194. 
 30 Id. at 1191. 
 31 Id.; Davis v. Omni-Care, Inc., No. 10-3806, 2012 WL 1959367, at *7 (6th Cir. June 
1, 2012); Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 572 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 32 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).  
 33 Id. at 2523–25. 
 34 Id. at 2524.  
 35 Id. at 2525. 
 36 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1761–
62 (2010) (noting the rise of the “new textualist” philosophy in the 1980s); see generally T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988) 
(describing various statutory interpretation techniques). 
 37 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70, 78 (2006) (noting that the dividing line between textualism and purposivism is not 
“cut-and-dried”); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 355 (2005) 
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conventions for determining the meaning of language, such as dictionaries, 
grammatical context, and other canons of construction.38  
Those espousing new textualist methods argue that the most appropriate 
way to interpret a statute is to determine the meaning of the words used by the 
legislature.39 Congress is required to say what it means in statutory language. 
Sources of meaning, such as legislative history, may not fully capture the 
intent of a multi-member legislative body or the compromises reached to 
ultimately pass a piece of legislation. For some pieces of legislation, finding a 
single legislative intent may not be possible.  
One main competing methodology of new textualism is intentionalism. 
Judges using this methodology often use the text of a statute plus other indicia 
of intent, such as legislative history, to determine what Congress intended.40  
The Supreme Court has used a textualist methodology in many 
employment discrimination cases.41 Both Gross and Nassar employ textualist 
methods.42 The majority opinion in both cases framed the primary issue as 
determining the meaning of the words “because of.”43 In doing so, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
(discussing the acknowledgement by textualists of the relevance of purpose in statutory 
interpretation); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 592–93 (1988) (commenting that a plain meaning analysis must 
take into account both the internal context of the statute as well as the external context). 
Further, there is strong disagreement regarding whether the courts are required to 
determine the meaning of the statute at the time of its enactment or whether the meaning of 
the statute can vary over time. See Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 21.  
 38 Gluck, supra note 36, at 1763. 
 39 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 
(2005). 
 40 The term “intentionalist” may be used to describe several different methods of 
statutory construction that allow the use of legislative history and other signals of intent, 
but these methods may differ significantly. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the 
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 366–68 (1994). Other 
intentionalists countenance the use of legislative and other materials to determine the plain 
meaning of the language in the first place. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325–26 
(1990). In this Article, the term “intentionalism” refers broadly to those methods of 
statutory construction that countenance the use of some method of legislative intent. The 
third way jurists commonly interpret statutes is by considering whether the broad purposes 
of a statute support a particular interpretation. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 
844, 861 (2005). For example, a court might look to the broad, remedial purposes of a 
statutory regime to serve as a guide on whether to read a particular statutory provision 
broadly or narrowly. 
 41 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?, Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 677–79 (1991) 
(discussing textualism in civil rights cases). 
 42 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–31 (2013); Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). 
 43 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524–25; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77.  
1114 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
added a new textualist canon to discrimination jurisprudence—unless 
Congress directs otherwise, the default meaning of words is a tort meaning.44  
In Nassar, the Court defined the interpretive question to involve the 
meaning of the words “because of,” which the Court characterized as a causal 
question.45 The Court cited numerous sections from the Restatement of Torts 
in support of its holding that Title VII’s retaliation provision requires a 
plaintiff to establish but-for cause.46 It also cited a torts treatise.47 Importantly, 
the Court did not undertake an extensive review of the full meaning of the tort 
concepts; nor did it explain why it is appropriate to apply causal principles 
from negligence law to discrimination law. Nassar shows the interpretive 
frame for analyzing discrimination statutes under the combined influences of 
tortfication and textualism. This interpretive frame requires the court to find a 
word in the discrimination statutes and then define that word as it would be 
defined under the common law.  
Gross provides a similar analysis. The Court framed the case as requiring 
the Court to define the words “because of” in the ADEA.48 The Court defined 
the ADEA’s causal language as requiring the plaintiff to establish but-for 
cause.49 It cited dictionaries and a torts treatise in support of this result.50 
III. DISCRIMINATION STATUTES DO NOT REQUIRE INTENT—EVEN  FOR 
DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS 
The next three Sections address radical changes in discrimination law that 
can happen if courts take the combined influences of tortification and 
textualism seriously. When combined, these two concepts resolve a key 
question in discrimination law: whether a plaintiff must establish intent to 
prevail on an individual disparate treatment claim. Courts have repeatedly 
asserted that disparate treatment claims are intentional.51 Neither the ADEA 
                                                                                                                     
 44 In other work, I have shown how this textual argument is not correct. See Sperino, 
Tort Label, supra note 4, at 1053. Notably, Staub does not purport to be driven by 
textualism, even though the opinion is written by Justice Scalia. Staub delineated USERRA 
as an intentional tort and applied proximate cause ideas to the statute, but it never 
connected these ideas with the language of the underlying statute. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 
131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191–94 (2011). 
 45 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525–26. 
 46 Id. at 2524–25. 
 47 Id.  
 48 Gross, 557 U.S. at 175–76. 
 49 Id. at 176. 
 50 Id. at 176–77. 
 51 See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, 
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009) 
(noting that “[f]ew propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of 
Title VII analysis than that the statute recognizes only ‘disparate treatment’ and ‘disparate 
impact’ theories of employment discrimination.”). 
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nor Title VII use the term “intent” in its primary operative language.52 Rather 
an employer violates the statute when it takes certain employment actions 
because of a protected trait. Numerous scholars have argued that this language 
refers to causation, not intent.53 More than two decades ago, Professor 
Oppenheimer laid the theoretical groundwork for a negligent discrimination 
claim.54 Although certain areas of discrimination law have aspects of 
negligence law, the idea that a plaintiff could establish a disparate treatment 
claim through a non-intent framework has not gained traction.55  
Staub reiterated that discrimination statutes are torts and that Congress 
adopted discrimination statutes against a common law backdrop.56 Gross and 
Nassar defined “because of” language in the ADEA and the Title VII 
retaliation provision to mean causation. Taken together, Gross, Staub, and 
Nassar provide a textual argument that Title VII and the ADEA allow a 
plaintiff to proceed on a disparate treatment claim without proving intent. 
In both Gross and Nassar, the Supreme Court interpreted the “because of” 
language in federal discrimination statutes to mean “but-for” cause. Both of 
these cases hold that the “because of” language is causal language.57 Tort law 
uses intent language to describe intent and causal language (like factual cause 
and legal cause) to discuss causation. If the discrimination statutes are torts, it 
is strange to assume that Congress meant to conflate both causal language and 
intent language in the words “because of.” No other words in the main 
operative language point toward intent. 
If Title VII and the ADEA are derived from the common law, then 
Congress knew how to use intent-like words when defining the elements of a 
claim. When the Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the elements of 
battery, it uses the concept of intent. It indicates that “[a]n actor is subject to 
liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or 
offensive contact with the person of the other . . . .”58 Likewise, the 
Restatement uses intent language to describe other intentional torts, such as 
                                                                                                                     
 52 When intent language is used in the statutes, it refers to affirmative defenses, or the 
plaintiff’s ability to obtain a jury trial or obtain certain types of remedies. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(a)(1) (2012) (stating that punitive and compensatory damages are available when a 
plaintiff proves intentional discrimination). 
 53 See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
1431, 1475 (2012) (discussing scholarship); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent 
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 916–17 (1993). 
 54 See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 53, at 916–17. 
 55 See, e.g., Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 3:08 CV 1471, 2009 WL 803586, at 
*2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009) (“He also alleges Defendant was merely ‘negligent’ in its 
hiring practices, which does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required 
by Title VII.”); Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Title 
VII, however, provides no remedy for negligent discrimination . . . .”).  
 56 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191, 1194 (2011). 
 57 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013); Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 58 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965). 
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assault and false imprisonment.59 That Congress chose not to use this same 
language in the primary operative language of the discrimination statutes, even 
though, according to the Supreme Court, it was acting against the backdrop of 
the common law, is telling. This argument is bolstered by the fact that 
Congress did use the words “intended” and “intention” in other provisions of 
Title VII.60 
The most textually compatible reading of the discrimination statutes is that 
they do not require the plaintiff to prove intent, but that the plaintiff may 
choose to try to make her case by showing intentional discrimination. This 
interpretation of the discrimination statutes is also more consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent. In 1971, the Supreme Court interpreted the original 
operative language of Title VII as allowing a disparate impact claim, which 
does not require a showing of intent.61 Failure-to-accommodate cases, for 
either religion or disability, do not require the plaintiff to establish that the 
decisionmaker possessed any animus or intent. There is no textual impediment 
to a non-intent-based claim outside the disparate impact and accommodation 
contexts. 
To read discrimination law as requiring intent, one has to read concepts 
into the statutory language that are not included in the actual text. In Nassar, 
the majority opinion indicated that the “desire to retaliate” must be the “but-
for” cause of the action taken.62 This articulation adds a step that is not 
supported by a tort reading. If “because of” means causation, then the 
employment action need only result from the fact of the protected trait, in that 
if the person had another protected trait, the outcome would be different. In the 
retaliation context this would mean the outcome would have been different if 
the plaintiff had not engaged in the protected activity. While in many 
instances, this result may happen because a bad actor harbors animus, animus 
is not required.63 
In some cases, whether the plaintiff has to establish intent determines 
whether the plaintiff will win or lose the case. Two examples help to illustrate 
the types of cases where the replacement of causation with intent would make 
a doctrinal difference. Before orchestras started using blind auditions, men 
were disproportionately selected for certain positions, even though there was 
no apparent animus or intent.64 When orchestras started using blind auditions, 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Id. §§ 21, 35 (assault and false imprisonment). 
 60 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012). 
 61 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–33 (1971). 
 62 Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2521. 
 63  The Gross decision, for the most part, does not blur this line between causation and 
intent. It holds that to prevail on a disparate-treatment claim, the plaintiff must establish 
that age was the but-for cause of the employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). 
 64 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of 
“Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 717–20 (2000). 
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it increased the number of women chosen.65 The non-blind selection procedure 
was allowing the outcome of the selection process to be affected by sex, even 
though it would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the orchestras intended 
to do so.66 Given the few orchestra positions available each year, it is very 
unlikely that a plaintiff would be available to establish a disparate impact 
claim. 
A second example is when an employer makes salary decisions by giving 
supervisors wide discretion in determining the amount of employees’ 
compensation. Assume that over time, most women who work for the 
employer or who work in particular positions receive a lower salary than men 
with similar credentials. The women cannot point to any particular animus or 
intent that is causing this outcome. Given the difficulties of establishing a 
disparate impact claim, it is important to know whether the female workers 
could proceed under a disparate treatment framework without showing intent.  
In both of these situations if “because of” means causation, the women 
may be able to prevail on their claim, even though they cannot point to a bad 
actor or establish intent. Their evidence could show that if they were men, they 
would have received the position or been paid more.67 Replacing an intent 
standard with a causation standard makes it possible to prove cases of 
unconscious or structural discrimination, without proceeding through a 
disparate impact analysis. 
This causation standard also allows us to conceptualize a separate form of 
employer liability that does not rely on the intent of individual actors. The 
federal discrimination statutes do not provide for individual liability. Rather, 
the employer is the entity liable for discrimination.68 Outside of pattern or 
practice claims, the courts have had trouble transferring the concept of intent 
to the entity context. Because traditional intent doctrines developed in the 
context of individual liability, they are sometimes difficult to apply to entities. 
With a causation standard, this difficulty diminishes. Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
shows a factual scenario where the switch from intent to causation is critical.69 
In Dukes, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart provided a spectrum of possible 
wages for employees in a particular position.70 The plaintiffs’ statistical 
evidence suggested that women were, on average, paid on the lower end of the 
pay spectrum.71 According to the plaintiffs’ allegations, Wal-Mart provided 
supervisors with wide discretion to make decisions about where to place 
employees along the spectrum.72 It is unlikely that the plaintiffs would be able 
to establish that the entity Wal-Mart had animus or even “intent” as courts 
                                                                                                                     
 65 Id. at 716. 
 66 Id. at 716–17. 
 67 The statistical analysis might be complex. 
 68 See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 69 Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547–48 (2011). 
 70 Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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tend to characterize that concept in the discrimination context. However, the 
plaintiffs may be able to establish that their sex made a difference in the 
outcome. If all other reasons for paying a worker less are stripped away and 
sex remains, the women could establish that sex caused the pay differential 
under a disparate treatment theory.  
IV. DISCRIMINATION’S INTENT STANDARD IS LESS ONEROUS 
Some plaintiffs may want to proceed under an intentional discrimination 
framework, even if the text of the discrimination statutes does not require them 
to do so. Their evidence may fit better within an intent narrative, and they may 
believe that juries and judges will find intentional discrimination claims more 
sympathetic. Under Title VII, plaintiffs may want to obtain punitive or 
compensatory damages, which are only available if the plaintiff proves 
intentional discrimination.73 
The move to tort law is important for three different intent issues. First, if 
we presume that courts should use tort law concepts to define intent then 
discrimination plaintiffs alleging intentional conduct should not be required to 
establish animus or mens rea. Second, tort law highlights how the courts have 
been inexact in defining what they mean by intent and what consequences a 
decisionmaker must intend. Third, using tort law opens the door for using the 
concept of transferred intent in discrimination cases. 
As discussed in the prior section, the discrimination statutes do not use the 
term “intent” to define the cause of action. Rather, the courts have developed 
this concept over time and sometimes refer to individual disparate treatment 
cases as requiring the plaintiff to show intent. Surprisingly, there is no 
Supreme Court case that expressly defines the intent required to prove 
discrimination. The cases that address intent provide a varied view of the 
requirement. Some cases appear to impose a heightened form of intent that is 
akin to animus or mens rea.74 Staub itself discusses the term “animus,” but this 
is largely due to the fact that the plaintiff had evidence of animus.75 Staub does 
not impose an animus requirement, but rather, it recognizes that the plaintiff 
may proceed using an animus construct.76 
Tort law makes it clear that the minimum standard for intentional tort 
culpability is not animus. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines intent as 
requiring that the actor desires the consequences of his action or “believes that 
the consequences are substantially certain to result from [the action].”77 If 
courts are required to presume that Congress was legislating against a common 
                                                                                                                     
 73 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012). 
 74 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 637 (2007) 
(using the term “animus”); Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 
7 (2011) (arguing that recent cases move away from an animus-based notion). 
 75 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
 76 Id.  
 77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
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law backdrop, then the courts should assume that the standard tort definition of 
intent applies in discrimination cases. Although some torts require a higher 
level of intent, it would be strange to presume that these less common 
meanings applied, without any explicit indication in the statutory language. 
Since the federal discrimination statutes do not even mention intent in their 
primary operative language, it is unlikely that Congress intended the further 
step of rejecting the traditional intent concept in favor of a higher animus 
standard.78 
The Restatement’s intent standard is two-pronged, allowing the plaintiff to 
prevail by establishing either definition of intent.79 Adding the substantial 
certainty test to discrimination law would be an important innovation. For 
example, consider an employer that has data showing that its employment 
practices result in a disparity based on sex. Perhaps the employer has 
knowledge that it uses subjective pay criteria and when supervisors use 
subjectivity that women are paid less than men. Future continued use of these 
subjective criteria would meet the substantial certainty intent standard. The 
employer would know that the outcome of its employment practice was 
substantially certain to result in pay differentials because of sex. 
Defining intent in the discrimination statutes in this way will help the 
courts to see a way in which they have not been careful about conceptualizing 
intent. Currently, the case law is unclear about whether the discriminatory 
actor must intend the differential outcome or whether the person only has to 
intend the employment action.  
An example is helpful in understanding the problem. Assume a situation in 
which a supervisor is making decisions about how much to pay two employees 
within a defined spectrum of potential pay. Without consciously thinking 
about it too much, the supervisor decides to pay the woman $10 an hour and 
the man $11 an hour. The supervisor is not consciously thinking about paying 
women less than men and would deny any animus or intent in a deposition. 
Assume the record would also show that an objective view of both employee’s 
work histories and performance do not justify the pay differential. 
In this scenario, the critical question is whether intent requires the 
decisionmaker to consciously take sex into account or to intend the differential 
outcome. If so, a woman would not be able to establish a discrimination claim. 
However, if the construct requires that the supervisor merely intend the pay 
decisions and that those decisions result in a pay differential tied to sex, then a 
plaintiff can prevail on an intentional discrimination claim. 
                                                                                                                     
 78 The move to tort law opens an interesting interpretive question under Title VII. In 
1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow a plaintiff to prevail if she is able to show a 
protected trait was a “motivating factor” in an employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) 
(2012). It is unclear whether this standard is merely a causal standard, or, if in mixed-
motive cases Congress meant to impose a higher “motive” requirement. See Staub, 131 
S. Ct. at 1195–96 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
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This second understanding of intent is consistent with how intent is 
conceived in trespass cases. In a trespass case, the tortfeasor is not required to 
know that he is physically present on the land of another to commit the 
intentional tort of trespass.80 The violation of the possessory interest of another 
does not require the knowledge that the interest is being violated. Using tort 
law to define intent shows how courts have not been careful in defining what a 
wrongdoer needs to intend to create liability under the discrimination statutes. 
Not only does tort law diminish the intent required in discrimination cases, 
it also allows the use of transferred intent. Intentional torts embrace the idea of 
transferred intent. For example, in assault cases, the intent required is to place 
someone in apprehension of a bodily contact.81 The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides examples of transferred intent. One of the illustrations is of a 
person, person C, who is intentionally aiming a gun at another person, person 
B.82 At that moment, person A comes from behind a tree and sees the gun 
pointed in his direction.83 C faces liability to A in this instance, even though 
the intent is originally against B, not A.84 This same idea could be used to 
expand the potential plaintiffs in discrimination cases.  
Consider the following example. Let’s assume that a supervisor sexually 
harasses Molly. The evidence establishes that all of his actions are focused on 
Molly and for the purposes of the hypothetical, let’s assume that the evidence 
will establish that the supervisor did not mean to sexually harass any other 
women. Nonetheless, Paula, another woman in the workplace, witnesses the 
harassment and reasonably believes that her opportunities in the workplace are 
limited or reasonably believes that witnessing the actions changes the terms or 
conditions of her work. Under a tort theory of intent, Paula could establish 
intent in this situation.  
Relying on tort law should radically change how courts describe and think 
about intent in discrimination cases. It should lower the intent standard, open 
the possibility for liability when the employer is substantially certain a result 
will occur, show instances where the courts have been inexact in describing 
the required nexus between intent and the negative outcome, and provide for 
transferred intent as a viable theory of recovery. 
V. THE HARM THRESHOLD IS LOWER 
If the discrimination statutes are torts, the courts must recalibrate the harm 
threshold for both harassment cases and for determining when an adverse 
employment action occurs. 
                                                                                                                     
 80 Id. § 158. 
 81 Id. § 32. 
 82 Id. § 32 cmt. b, illus. 3. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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Some harassment cases involve physical touching or imminent, threatened 
touching.85 Tort law categorizes this conduct as battery or assault.86 Despite 
this strong connection with tort law, court interpretation of the discrimination 
statutes sometimes imposes more onerous requirements than those imposed for 
battery and assault. 
In 1986, the Supreme Court officially recognized harassment as a type of 
discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.87 In that case the plaintiff 
alleged that her supervisor fondled and raped her, so harassment doctrine 
originally developed in the context of battery and assault.88 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court imposed requirements on plaintiffs that are sometimes more 
onerous than under tort law. 
To be actionable a hostile work environment must affect the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.89 In interpreting when harassment 
would rise to this level, the Court held that it must be “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment . . . .”90 In 1993, 
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging harassment need not allege 
psychological injury, but would be required to establish that she subjectively 
believed the environment to be hostile or abusive and that the environment 
would be so viewed by an objective person.91 In making this latter inquiry, the 
Court noted:  
But we can say that whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” can be 
determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the 
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.92 
                                                                                                                     
 85 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986); Hockman v. 
Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir. 2004); Shepherd v. Comptroller of 
Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872–75 (5th Cir. 1999); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 21 (1965). 
 87 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72. 
 88 Id. at 60. 
 89 Id. at 67. 
 90 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993). 
 92 Id. at 23. Although there are some variations, courts tend to articulate a harassment 
claim as requiring proof that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she was 
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, that the harassment was based on sex, and that 
it affected a term, condition or privilege of employment. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. 
Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009). The fourth element contains both 
objective and subjective components, requiring the harassment to be “severe or pervasive 
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment,” as well as requiring 
the victim to subjectively perceive the working conditions to be so altered. Id. (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Under tort law, the invasion of a person’s physical space in a harmful or 
offensive way or the imminent threat of such invasion is enough to establish 
the tort.93 This is not the case with harassment law, where the plaintiff must 
establish that she perceived the conduct to be severe or pervasive enough to 
affect her work and that an objective, reasonable person would also perceive 
the conduct that way.94 These requirements have led to absurd results. Courts 
have declared that the following conduct does not constitute harassment as a 
matter of law: kissing, slapping a worker on the behind with a newspaper, 
brushing up against a plaintiff’s breast and behind, rubbing the plaintiff’s arm 
from shoulder to wrist, and attempting to touch the plaintiff on numerous 
occasions.95  
If discrimination statutes are torts, then physical invasions should be 
treated with the same level of respect with which physical invasions are treated 
under tort law. The plaintiff should not be required to show repeated 
inappropriate touching or especially extreme inappropriate touching to prove 
her claim. Rather, if discrimination is a tort, discrimination law should 
recognize that intrusions upon physical dignity constitute cognizable harm. 
Invasions or threatened invasions of this interest should result in liability 
without repeated or especially egregious conduct. 
Embracing textualism and tortification can also expand how the courts 
perceive remedies. For most torts, tort law separates the idea of injury from 
damages. In a trespass case, a defendant is liable for invading the possessory 
interest of another, even if he does not harm a single blade of grass on the 
plaintiff’s property.96 Likewise, a person commits a battery simply by poking 
another person with his pinkie finger in an offensive way, even if no physical 
harm results.97 In both of these cases, the harm happens when the interest is 
violated.98 
This dichotomy between injury and damages typically is not an issue in 
discrimination cases because the plaintiff often has proof of monetary or 
emotional harm. In most cases, the idea of injury and compensable damages 
does not need to be separated. But, in some cases, the dichotomy is critically 
important. 
All courts will recognize a cause of action when an employer takes an 
action that is explicitly prohibited by the federal discrimination statutes, such 
as termination or failure to hire. Some federal courts refuse to allow a plaintiff 
                                                                                                                     
 93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 21 (1965). 
 94 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–23. 
 95 See, e.g., Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir. 
2004); Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872–75 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965). 
 97 Id. § 18. 
 98 Id. §§ 18, 163. Negligence incorporates damages as part of the elements of the 
plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 898–99 
(Mass. 2009). 
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to proceed on a discrimination claim if the courts do not deem her harm to be 
serious enough.99 The courts call this concept “adverse employment action” or 
“ultimate employment action.”100 
There is no consensus on the required level of harm, and one court noted 
that “[d]ivergent authority, nationwide, obscures the parameters of adverse 
employment action.”101 Some courts have held that criticism or counseling do 
not constitute an adverse employment action.102 Some courts hold that 
negative evaluations are not serious enough to result in liability.103 In other 
words, even if a plaintiff proves that her supervisor gave her a bad evaluation 
based on her sex or race, the plaintiff cannot prevail on a discrimination claim 
in courts with a higher harm threshold. 
This result does not follow from either textualism or most tort law. Title 
VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against “any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” 
and also prohibits the employer from limiting employees in any way that 
“would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”104 Getting negative 
evaluations affects an employee’s “terms or conditions” of employment and 
also deprives or tends to deprive the person of employment opportunities or 
otherwise affects her status. 
Other than imposing a de minimis threshold, most torts do not define the 
minimal level of harm that must occur to establish a violation. Once the 
interest is violated, the plaintiff can legally establish the claim without proving 
additional harm. If discrimination law is like most torts, then once the 
                                                                                                                     
 99 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 60–61 (2006) (discussing 
adverse action requirement in discrimination and retaliation cases). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Me. 1996).  
 102 Id. at 281–82 (applying adverse employment action concept to Title IX retaliation 
claim but claiming to use Title VII standards); Fausto v. Welch, No. 89-1542-WF, 1994 
WL 568846, at *7 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1994) (“Disparaging remarks can, under proper 
circumstances, constitute an adverse employment action [under Title VII]. To do so, 
however, such disparaging comments must significantly impair the employee's ability to 
function in his position.”); see also Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 
94-6906, 1996 WL 131948, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1996) (criticism is not adverse 
employment action under the ADA); Lefevre v. Design Prof’l Ins. Cos., No. C-93-20720 
RPA, 1994 WL 544430, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 1994) (harsh criticism of an 
employee's work does not constitute adverse employment action). 
 103 See, e.g., Sotomayor v. City of N.Y., 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), 
aff’d, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013); Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-CV-3582, 
2012 WL 5989874, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (being rated as having unsatisfactory 
performance not sufficient to constitute an adverse action); Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & 
Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Johnson v. Frank, 828 F. Supp. 
1143, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rating of “unacceptable” at mid-year review not an adverse 
employment action). 
 104 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).  
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employer violates the underlying interest, the plaintiff should be able to prevail 
on a claim, unless the statute provides otherwise.  
VI. TORT COMMON LAW IS BOTH MEANING AND METHOD 
Together, tortification and textualism can radically alter substantive 
discrimination law. But tortification poses a bigger challenge to the very 
meaning of textualism. Tort law is a set of substantive, doctrinal choices. 
Those choices are paired with a common law methodology in approaching 
problems. If employment discrimination is a tort, does it retain both the 
substantive content of tort words and its underlying methodology?  
Recent Supreme Court cases claim that discrimination law is a tort and 
that Congress intended that the statutes’ words be interpreted against the 
backdrop of tort law.105 Unless otherwise indicated, the Court is required to 
look to tort law to define statutory terms. Implicit within this statement is the 
idea that Congress understood what the common law of torts was and how it 
would interact with the statute it was passing. One fundamental aspect of tort 
law is that it was created using a common law methodology, where the 
meaning of words and concepts develop over time and respond to changed 
circumstances. In other words, common law torts maintain some flexibility to 
change over time. 
This flexibility raises important questions about what textualism means if 
Congress intended to import common law tort concepts into a statutory 
regime. There are at least three possible answers to these questions. First, 
when Congress enacted the discrimination statutes, it could have intended to 
adopt current tort principles, along with their underlying common law 
methodology. Under this approach, Congress intended the language in the 
statute to develop over time, just as tort law does. Second, Congress could 
have intended to adopt common law words, but to only allow discrimination 
law to change in the future if tort common law changed. The third, and least 
plausible, argument is that Congress intended to enshrine a particular 
substantive tort meaning that becomes frozen within the statute, even though 
tort law changes over time. In other words, it is unlikely that Congress 
intended to reject a major tenet of tort law (its methodology) without an 
express indication that it was doing so. 
One basic feature of the common law is the way that it can change in 
response to changed circumstances. The common law largely remains stable 
over time given judicial commitment to stare decisis, but there are moments 
when the common law changes drastically. When traditional notions of 
causation and proof did not work for modern problems, courts changed the 
common law to account for the changing factual landscape.106 Some examples 
                                                                                                                     
 105 See supra Part II. 
 106 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) 
(discarding privity requirements for certain injury claims involving defective products). 
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of this include the separation of factual cause and proximate cause concepts, 
the recognition of comparative negligence, and the development of products 
liability law and concomitant abolition of privity concepts.  
However, current popular models for interpreting statutes rely on notions 
of legislative intent and textualism, both of which are difficult to marry with 
common law methodology, unless one subscribes to forms of dynamic 
statutory interpretation.107 This problem is amplified by the ways the courts 
approach stare decisis with regard to statutes, adopting an especially strong 
presumption against overruling prior interpretations of statutes.108 
Given that a central feature of the common law is its occasional elasticity, 
a fair argument flowing from the tortification of discrimination law is that 
Congress also intended the courts to have the flexibility to engage the statutory 
language and to adjust its contours over time in response to changing 
circumstances. While thus far the tortification of discrimination law has led to 
increasingly pro-employer interpretations of the statutes, this one feature of 
tortification provides an opportunity for courts to allow the discrimination 
statutes to respond to modern understandings about the ways people are 
treated differently because of protected traits. 
In other words, if Congress thought discrimination law was a tort, this 
intent expressed two separate ideas: (1) read the statutes initially to be in 
tandem with tort principles and (2) maintain flexibility within the law to deal 
with changed circumstances, as tort law does. This second idea is a powerful 
challenge to modern statutory interpretation, especially textualism. It also is a 
challenge to the idea of “super stare decisis” in the statutory context. 
When common law definitions are applied to statutes without using a 
common law methodology, there is a risk that the definitions become 
inflexible, even if this result would not obtain under the common law. This is 
because the courts tend to view statutory words as having one fixed meaning 
that does not change over time. Imagine for a second a world in which there 
were common law causes of action for employment discrimination. Given the 
flexibility of the common law methodology, one would expect the meaning of 
its central elements to change over time, even if the common law tort retained 
its central structure and language.109 If discrimination law is truly a tort, it 
                                                                                                                     
 107 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
 108 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (2005) (“A majority of the circuits has explicitly adopted the 
super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents, and in those circuits that 
have never explicitly applied the rule, separate opinions assume that it applies.”) (footnotes 
omitted); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 
1362 (1988) (discussing “super-strong” statutory stare decisis in the Supreme Court). 
 109 For an example of this phenomenon in the torts context, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS 
& JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 132–
133 (2010) (discussing how courts used but-for causation standard in wrongful birth cases 
but reframed the inquiry over time to allow plaintiffs to proceed on claims). 
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should retain the flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances over time, 
including new understandings of how discrimination occurs. 
Another possibility is that Congress intended for the discrimination 
statutes to be read initially in tandem with tort principles and that the statutes 
should remain in tandem with tort principles over time. This claim is also in 
tension with modern statutory interpretations that purport to identify one 
meaning of a term within a statute and then provide that meaning with an 
especially robust precedential effect.  
The Supreme Court has implicitly adopted this kind of reasoning, that the 
discrimination statutes should keep pace with modern understandings of tort 
law. Nassar provides a good example. The Restatement (First) of Torts 
considered proximate cause and factual cause to be a singular concept.110 In 
negligence cases, a defendant’s actions were a legal cause of harm if they were 
“a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”111 The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts retains a similar unitary concept.112 It is not until after the enactment 
of both Title VII and the ADEA that the ideas of proximate cause and factual 
cause are defined separately in the Restatement.113 
As discussed earlier, Nassar held that the words “because of” in Title 
VII’s retaliation provision mean that the plaintiff must establish protected 
activity was a but-for cause of an adverse action.114 However, this holding 
does not reflect the Restatement published at the time of the statute’s 
enactment. If it did, legal cause under the retaliation provision would have 
been a substantial factor test, conflating what a modern lawyer would separate 
into legal and factual cause. Instead, Nassar explicitly relied on definitions of 
tort concepts that were not formalized in the Restatement until after Congress 
enacted the relevant statute.115  
This interpretive move has big implications for statutory interpretation 
principles. Congress’s intent, as expressed in textual language, can be an intent 
for a word to change meanings over time. The “super stare decisis” principle 
cannot hold for words that the courts declare as deriving from the common 
law. 
                                                                                                                     
 110 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 430 (1934) (indicating that to establish legal 
cause the plaintiff must be in the class of persons to which the defendant’s actions create a 
risk of causing harm); id. § 431 (defining legal cause as being a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm, without an exception to relieve the defendant of responsibility); 
id. § 433 (defining legal cause with concepts such as whether there was a continuous force 
or series of forces and whether the harm was highly extraordinary given the defendant’s 
conduct). 
 111 Id. § 431. 
 112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). 
 113 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. a (2010) (recounting historical development).  
 114 See supra Part II. 
 115 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2010); 
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
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The third option—that Congress intended to enshrine a specific tort 
meaning at the time of enactment and for that meaning to be entrenched even 
as the common law changed—is the least plausible. As noted above, the 
Supreme Court does not appear to be trying to divine common law tort 
meanings from the time of each statute’s enactment. This third option also 
requires the belief that Congress meant to adopt the common law of torts 
without one of its primary features: its ability to change over time.  
It also creates the problem that over time the statutes will enshrine old 
versions of the common law, even as the courts modify the underlying tort law 
over time in light of changed circumstances. The statutes then become out of 
sync with the very concepts Congress was trying to enshrine. A further 
difficulty is added by statutory amendments. When Congress amends a statute, 
is it meaning to bring the entire statute in line with current common law or 
only revised portions of the statutes? 
One response to this argument could be that by making a statutory tort, 
Congress intended to divest concepts of their evolving nature. It is difficult to 
determine what Congress understood with respect to Title VII and the ADEA 
because modern statutory interpretation was not used in 1964 and 1967 when 
Congress passed Title VII and the ADEA. More importantly, in Gross and 
Nassar, the Supreme Court held that if Congress wanted to contradict the 
common law, it was required to do so expressly.116 If Congress wanted to 
reject a core feature of the common law—its ability to change over time—it is 
fair to require Congress to articulate that desire. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The move to tortify discrimination law is not supported by the history, 
text, or purpose of the federal discrimination statutes. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court is strongly imbuing discrimination law with a tort conception 
and meaning. It also is increasingly viewing these statutes through the 
interpretive device of textualism. Given these moves, it is necessary to 
consider what tortification and textualism mean for the discrimination statutes. 
This Article demonstrates that both of these arguments can be used to broaden 
the scope of discrimination law. They also radically challenge current ideas 
about statutory interpretation and the fixed meaning of statutory terms. 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 116 See id. at 2529; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173–75 (2009). 
 
